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Trust and Leadership –  
On the Value Laden Concept of Trust 
 
By Anders Bordum 
 
     The concept and phenomenon of trust and its relation to leadership has 
recently come into focus. What role does trust play? Can trust be created 
strategically? Questions like these are often raised. How we conceive of and 
conceptualize trust is not as often discussed. Among those 
conceptualizations of trust available are those understanding trust as 
normatively value laden and those attempting to understand trust as 
normatively neutral. In this article I will attempt to challenge the idea that trust 
as a concept and phenomenon meaningfully can be understood as 
symmetrical and normatively neutral.  
     One need not continue the phrase “trust is good,” with “control is better,” 
as e.g., Stalin did.  Let us stop with “trust is good,” and look at the 
implications of this evaluation.  It is my conviction that trust is normally 
something which is normatively desirable, and that trust is a concept which 
cannot be exempted from a discussion of value judgment.  This is perhaps 
because trust as a phenomenon is good in itself, even before it becomes 
good for something else.  This point of view has consequences for 
understanding trust as connected to a systematic form of observation which is 
more or less directly claimed to be normatively neutral.i  Such a view on 
analyzing trust presupposes that trust and mistrust are symmetrical and not 
so different.  Such a point of view makes it possible for the terminology to 
maintain its normative neutrality (Luhmann 1979).  Understanding trust by 
defining it as a conception characterized by normative neutrality is in the 
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system theoretical universe interconnected with the fundamental premise that 
functionality and functional self-stabilization are more important than validity.  
The assumption of neutrality is also interconnected with the idea that 
functionality is normatively neutral and is not in itself attributed value 
judgments.  Mistrust becomes, in principle, as equally good a form of 
observation as trust – or more explicitly stated, the question of good becomes 
irrelevant in the systems theoretical universe – all that is relevant is that both 
observations claim to be able to reduce complexity.  It is this viewpoint on 
value related neutrality and concept related symmetry I wish to subject to a 
critical evaluation.  At the same time I am interested in showing that one can 
in fact say something about trust and trust production by exposing some of 
the conditions which lay at the foundation for declaring trust or mistrust. 
     My argument against the understanding of trust as value neutral is divided 
into five sections wherein I address different aspects of trust as a concept and 
phenomenon.  In the first section, I address the trust concept’s connection 
with other related concepts, and show the inherent attribution of value within 
the concept.  In the following section, I show the complexity which arises in 
and with that trust both can be a precondition for and a product of social 
processes.  The creation of trust can be both the intentionally intended and 
functionally unintended; for example, trust can be something that is desirable, 
but can arise without anyone having planned it.  In the third section, I argue 
that there is a difference between having trust in a phenomenon and having 
trust in one’s knowledge of the same phenomenon.  The fourth section 
addresses the question in relation to the trust phenomena’s strategic flexibility 
of form for example, the idea that one with leadership tools can consciously 
bring forth trust.  In the conclusion, the question about trust communication is 
addressed.  In this section I argue that trust is positively value-laden, because 
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sincerity is a functional and pragmatic condition for successful communication 
which is oriented towards understanding. 
 
 
The Trust Concept’s Family Resemblance 
 
In the work Philosophical Investigations, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein 
asked the question, what is it which is common to board games, card games, 
ball games, and all other games?  Wittgenstein claims that there are no 
specific characteristics which are common for all games, but still believes that 
there are resemblances and relations which connect them to each other.  
These resemblances, which are found in a complicated network of relations, 
Wittgenstein calls family resemblances.  All games create a sort of family and 
they are similar to each other in single ways just as family members look like 
one another in the nose, eyes, etc., so that the commonality for the relations 
can be understood abstractly as family resemblance (Wittgenstein 1953:67). 
     Trust and mistrust have as concepts and phenomena a large number of 
related concepts.  In other words, a number of concepts are to be found 
which we normally connect to trust or with mistrust which demonstrate a form 
of family resemblance.  Let’s imagine a situation where we have complete 
trust in a person, for example a leader.  We have trust in the leader’s 
knowledge and sense of morality.  Our trust embraces the leader as a person 
and as a decision maker, as well as in all other relevant roles.  We have, in 
other words, an ideal situation characterized by ideal trust.  If we in this 
situation ask ourselves which words and concepts it would be the most 
meaningful to employ to describe our trust and mistrust – or if we ask 
ourselves with which words and concepts we can justify why we declare trust 
or mistrust, it becomes apparent that not all words are equally satisfactory. 
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     My idea is that we, with the point of departure in the above ideal situation, 
can construct a linguistic test of trust declarations which has a propositional 
form, and which can include concepts which have a family resemblance with 
the concept trust.  This test will examine the words which can meaningfully 
and respectively support and justify declarations of ideal trust and mistrust.  
The test will be supplemented with the simple rule that a concept and its 
negative counterpart cannot both and in every same regard justify the 
declaration of trust.  Language offers, for example, a characterization of the 
leader as trustworthy or untrustworthy.  We can not in the same regard 
meaningfully describe the leader as both trustworthy and untrustworthy.  If we 
shall justify our trust to our ideal person, a reference to trustworthiness will be 
more sufficient than a reference to this person being untrustworthy.  If we 
shall justify our trust - a justification which claims that the leader holds his 
promises and stands by his words is better than a reference to the leader’s 
breach of promises or the unreliability of his words.  On the other hand, 
untrustworthiness, breach of promise, and unreliability of speech can 
contribute to a justification of why we eventually declare mistrust in a person.  
The characteristic dependability will likewise be more relevant than 
undependability to justify why we have trust in a person.  Trust can be 
justified with reference to a judgment of a person’s knowledge, sense of 
justice, or legitimacy. The justification would not be sufficient if we attempt to 
justify our trust with regard to lack of knowledge, injustice, or illegitimacy.  It 
is, in other words, meaningless to justify one’s trust in a person with reference 
to this person as untrustworthy, unreliable, irresponsible, or the like.  Such a 
justification would indicate that one has not understood the language and the 
meaning in the words.  Here I would like to present a schema in which, I have 
attempted to place concepts which have a family resemblance with trust, and 
which could be immediately included in a justification for an declaration of 
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trust in the left column, and the concept’s counterparts, which could not, in 
the right column. 
 
The schema below shows concepts which are normally connected with trust, 
and with its counterpart, distrust.  I do not claim that the concepts in the left 
column are necessary or in themselves adequate, but that they can contribute 
to a justification of a declaration of trust.  Although the schema is not 
complete, the schema’s left column indicates that the trust concept, culturally 
seen and in daily language use, is tied to a normative positive value.  Trust is 
good, just as the other words and concepts which we can justify a declaration 
of trust with have a positive value. 
 
The normativity and attribution of value can only be confirmed empirically if 
we were to ask a number of persons which descriptions, conditions, and 
attributes they would prefer that their ideal leader fit - those in the left or the 
right column?  It is my conviction that most sensible people will prefer the 
schema’s left side - because the desirability of these characteristics lies 
inherent in our culture (Anscombe 1957:69-71).  Trust is normally something 
positive, desirable, and good.  It is only because the culture and the language 
bear these values that we can use the words evaluatively to attribute value 
judgments.  To claim that trust doesn’t have an inherent positive value 
appears to me to be a misconception of culture.  Such a point of view 
excludes the speaker from the culture to which they belong. 
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Trust: 
Concepts which have a family 
resemblance to trust and which could 
be included in and contribute to a 
justification for a declaration of trust. 
 
Mistrust: 
Concepts which do not have a family 
resemblance with trust, but which 
could contribute to and be included in 
a justification for a declaration of 
mistrust. 
 
Trust (trust presupposes trust) 
 
Trustworthiness 
Sincerity 
Authenticity 
Confiding 
Truth and Truthfulness 
Promises and Holding of Promises 
 
Honour and Honourability 
Morality and Ethics 
Accountability 
Hope and Faith 
Loyalty 
Legitimacy, Legality 
Knowledge, Objectivity, Science 
 
Justice and Fairness 
Free Will 
Security 
Responsibility 
In Control 
Not Manipulated 
One’s Own Freedom and Self-
Determination 
Acceptance of Risk (risk-involved 
communication). 
Performative Consistency (where one 
does what one says). 
Will to Continue Interaction (for 
example in the form of a will to co-
operate). 
Predictability 
 
 
Mistrust (mistrust becomes self-
amplifying). 
Untrustworthiness 
Insincerity 
Inauthenticity 
Wary (foreign) 
Falsehood and Lie. 
Breach of Promise and Unreliable 
Speech. 
Dishonour and Dishonourability. 
Immorality and a Lack of Ethics. 
Unaccountability 
Hopelessness and a Lack of Faith. 
Disloyalty 
Illegitimacy, Illegality. 
Ignorance, Attribution of value, 
Overriding Belief. 
Injustice and Unfairness. 
Involuntary (and powerlessness). 
Insecurity 
Irresponsibility 
Lack of Control 
Manipulating 
The Others’ Freedom and Self 
Determination. 
Risk Aversiveness (interpretation of 
danger). 
Manipulated Self-Portrayal and 
Performative Inconsistency. 
Unwillingness to Continue Interaction 
(for example, if one is uncooperative).
 
Unpredictability 
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Trust as a Precondition For and a Product Of Social Processes. 
 
There is a difference between wanting to understand trust, and wanting to 
create trust as a phenomenon.  An executive who has realized that trust is 
good because it is a condition for a number of social processes will be lead to 
seek the means to create more trust.  The wish does not spring from an 
observation which is neutral in the attribution of value, but from a normative 
idea that trust is good.  Such a search assumes that trust is something one 
can form strategically, as well as that there is a direct relationship between 
means and goal.  Trust and action are not always directly related.  A problem 
with planned trust production is that many social processes presuppose one 
or another form of trust which is not at all dealt with and touched upon in the 
process itself, but in fact is its necessary foundation.  Trust is confirmed and 
strengthened, surprisingly enough, as an unintended side effect of the same 
processes when they proceed successfully.  In this sense, the desirable trust 
is created without anyone having wished for it, planned it, or been conscious 
of the desirable in the production of trust.  It complicates a strategically 
planned production of trust.  Let’s look at two examples. 
 
   (1) The money which we exchange on the market presupposes that we 
have trust in money media as a unit functioning as a bearer of value.  Money 
does not, as does gold, bear its own value. The value of money arises 
because we trust that it can be exchanged for gold or other wares which in 
themselves have value. When we make deals with one another and use 
monetary means to make our inter-exchange more fluid, flexible, and 
effective, we are involved in reproducing trust in the monetary unit.  This 
happens without our planning it, and without it directly involving the social 
 9
process wherein our deals take place.  Trust can, in this way, arise as an 
unintended side-effect and unplanned consequence. 
     (2) It is difficult to exercise leadership today if one cannot trust one’s 
employees.  It is often forgotten that good leadership over time can create 
and strengthen trust between the leadership and the employees.  Just as 
trust in the monetary unit becomes strengthened in and with that money is 
used to mediate (facilitate) the exchange of goods, services, money, and 
work.  Trust is a precondition for trust-creating leadership processes being 
able to proceed.  An alternative to leadership on the basis of trust is to lead 
on the basis of a use of power which forbids criticism.  Exercising direct 
power with regard to threats of sanctions is problematic in today’s world.  The 
semantics of power and surveillance have become less legitimate social 
conventions than they have been earlier.  Patriarchal leadership through the 
use of commands has become an outdated leadership principle.  As a 
modern leader, one can use semantics of trust instead of the rhetoric of 
threats.  Today, orders are often wrapped in semantics of trust, love, or 
friendship. When the modern leader says:  “I trust that you…” it can be an 
advanced way in which to give the order for the employee to accommodate to 
the leader’s plans of action.  It is a fundamental political experience that 
“power provokes opposition,” which shall be understood in that there is 
seldom found the exercise of simple power which does not provoke a reaction 
to this power, potentially in the form of opposition.  It is typical that the more 
one exercises power the greater the reaction there is against that same 
exercise of power.  Bad leadership can produce opponents instead of 
cooperative employees.  The problem connected with every form of power is 
therefore that those who one will direct and control with direct power turn 
against this power in a way which can dissolve the form of power’s practical 
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value.  Exercise of power is therefore often all too costly and demanding of 
resources. 
     We can look at a scenario where the rationalization expert, standing 
beside the director, calls out over the factory floor:  “We must bring down 
costs and increase productivity.  We expect an increase in efficiency of 20 
percent already this year . . . .”  Employee Jensen stands beside his machine 
and shouts back:  “We are two to decide that, pal!”  The more Jensen is 
pressured, the more time and energy Jensen will use to withstand the 
pressure.  And Jensen often knows the game and the weak points in the 
machinery best.  If Jensen is pressed too hard, his machine begins to break 
down and make faulty products.  If Jensen is pressed harder he becomes ill, 
unmotivated, or service-hostile.  It therefore becomes counter productive to 
press Jensen with an exercise of power if Jensen exercises opposition and 
counter-power.  The case is presented as an example with the pedagogical 
goal of establishing what happens if Jensen instead had been exposed to a 
leadership communication coded around affection, friendship, or trust.  What 
would Jensen’s oppositional reaction to the leader’s declaration of trust have 
been?  Jensen would be unable to negate the trust, to say “no thanks” to the 
trust.  He would have a difficult time legitimizing his possible opposition.  By 
coding leadership power around trust, the oppositional reaction to power is 
dissolved because declarations of trust are so difficult to reject. This may be 
because trust is good. Who would not want the leader’s trust?  It can happen 
that the trust one needs and which is constitutive in social processes 
disappears if the leader uses too much false leadership communication, 
where promises and threats cannot be honored. 
     We can present the monetary unit and leadership as examples of 
processes which rely upon trust and which create trust, but which are not 
directly in themselves related to questions of trust.  When the financial market 
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and leadership function, trust is built up on its own unnoticed.  The examples 
indicate that trust can both be an intentionally planned product of leadership, 
and can functionally arise as an unintended consequence.  
     If we self-referentially ask if we can have trust in our trust, the problem 
becomes overly complex, because the functionality becomes intended.  The 
constitutive trust in social processes easily becomes very vulnerable, 
because it can only be justified functionally via its beneficial function, which is 
a function that often only is able to be maintained if the trust can be 
presupposed. Trust production presupposes trust, because many social 
processes could not in any way be realized without always already 
presupposing a minimum measure of mutual trust.  Therefore trust and 
mistrust are more than simply neutral observations.  A rhetorical analogy 
supporting this argument could be that if we as people causally seen have a 
need for clean water in order to survive, it would be unsuitable to claim that 
clean water / dirty water is simply an observation which can be disregarded.  
Clean water is valuable and value-laden, whether we recognize and observe 
it or not.  Just as we have the need for clean water to survive, we have a 
need for trust in social processes where people have expectations of each 
other. 
 
 
Trust in an Object versus Trust to One’s Knowledge of the Object 
 
That which is possible and cannot be otherwise is necessary. Necessity 
represents the absence of possible change and changeability.  We can have 
knowledge in the classic platonic sense in the form of insight into necessities 
there where we have full control, and where everything happens according to 
necessity, (Bordum 2000:93). Exactly when necessity is the case, it is easy 
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and also safe to trust that things will be and will remain as expected.  Our 
expectations are in such a case formed by a knowledge of the unchangeable.  
We do not risk anything by demonstrating trust before mistrust, when 
necessity comes into the picture.  The mathematical relations between a 
right-angled triangle’s three sides do not change no matter where and when 
we are presented with a right-angled triangle.  We can therefore not be 
surprised or have our expectations disappointed.  It is naturally not that which 
happens by necessity which creates the greatest need for trust, even though 
we can have trust in the necessary.  We especially have a need for trust in 
connection with the contingent, where there are more choices and more 
possibilities open.  It is here where things can change, being neither 
impossible nor necessary.  It is not necessarily a self-contradiction when the 
trust problem is meaningful both in relation to the contingent and necessary.  
Here we have two different sorts of trust. It is the difference between having 
trust in one’s knowledge of a phenomenon or an object we have in our sights, 
and to have trust in the phenomenon itself or the object we are looking at. 
     We can, for example, have good justifications for not trusting a person, 
because we know that they always do something we don’t expect and don’t 
wish, at the same time that we have trust in our knowledge of this person.  
Another example can be taken from a situation where we must go over a 
deep canyon by walking over a hanging bridge which appears to be in terrible 
shape.  Here we can have the knowledge that the hanging bridge is unsafe.  
In such a scenario, we would not have trust in the object, but in our 
knowledge of it.  Surprisingly enough we would in this situation have 
knowledge of the relation which justifies mistrust, at the same time that we 
have trust in our knowledge.  In this way trust can have two radically different 
meanings, either as a cognitively well-grounded judgment about something 
else (trust in our knowledge regarding the hanging bridge) or as something 
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non-cognitive we can substitute with there where we don’t have and maybe 
cannot have knowledge, and the implicated instrumental control (trust in the 
hanging bridge holding).  Here we have neither knowledge nor control, and 
must run a risk. In this instance trust appears, however, to cover and replace 
this need.  There where trust has a presuppositional form involving an 
acceptance of risk based upon a faith in our expectations not being 
disappointed in the future, can be called naive trust. 
Trust has two almost contradictory functions as we can see in the schema 
below. 
 
 
 
 Trust (or mistrust) in a 
Phenomenon: 
 
Trust (or mistrust) in 
Knowledge of a 
Phenomenon 
Trust as a Substitute 
for a Justified 
Expectation: 
 
E.g.  Naive trust 
 
This category does not 
exist, because 
knowledge per definition 
is always justified. 
Trust as a Justified 
Expectation: 
 
E.g.  Trust as justified in 
positive experiences 
with that or those one 
has trust in. 
E.g. Trust in the validity 
of knowledge about a 
phenomenon. 
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Mistrust and trust hold each others’ hand.  But only by accounting for mistrust 
can trust be substantiated.  Even though trust is something we can decide to 
demonstrate when confronted with a choice, our justification can well refer to 
a form of knowledge.  We can also justify our decision with reference to 
experience, feelings, and other non-cognitive circumstances.  There is of 
course always a risk that we are in error and misjudge the situation.  No 
declaration of trust renounces fallibilism, as there is always a possibility that 
we may fail in our judgment.  Agreement between expectations and reality 
harbours trust, as mistrust is fed when a disparity occurs between 
expectations and reality.  Expectations can either be of a flexible kind, which 
one is capable of and willing to change, or be something which one for any 
price will hold on to.  Expectation’s level of inflexibility has therefore the 
character of a value judgment.  Declarations of trust and mistrust become 
dependent on whether expectations are inflexible or variable.  Such a thought 
process allows for an avenue between trust and mistrust we can call 
openness for the revision of expectations. Expectations are always products 
of interpretations and are mediate, contrary to beliefs, which can sometimes 
be formed instantaneously and immediately, as when someone throws a ball 
at us.  
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  Inflexible and 
Unchangeable 
Expectations: 
 
Open and Variable 
Expectations: 
Disappointed 
Expectations: 
 
Gives justification for 
mistrust 
 
 
Gives justification for 
revision of expectations 
 
Fulfilled Expectations: 
 
Gives fallible justification 
for trust 
 
Gives justification for a 
continuation of course of 
action 
 
 
 
As such, trust is good when it is based on fulfilled expectations, in that it does 
not block the given course of action. 
 
 
The Trust Phenomenon’s Strategic Transformability 
 
Trust is sometimes thought of as the precondition for social processes, at 
other times as the product of these processes. The latter approach in 
particular often views trust as something intended one can form, construct, 
and bring forth in a strategically planned production.  Sometimes trust 
appears as a means in a goal-directed action, because it shall be used for 
something else.  At other times, trust becomes understood as a goal in itself. 
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  Intended: 
 
Unintended: 
 
Means: 
 
E.g.  Trust is understood 
as something one can 
and should build up, 
because one can 
achieve an advantage.  
Trust is understood as 
strategically variable. 
 
E.g.  When trust 
functions as an 
unrecognized, but 
necessary condition for 
other wished for social 
processes. 
 
 
Goal in Itself: 
 
E.g.  Trust is understood 
as something one can 
and should build up, 
because trust is good in 
itself.  Trust is not 
understood as 
strategically variable 
(but vulnerable). 
 
The category is non-
existent.  The goal is 
always set by someone 
and is therefore always 
intended. 
 
 
 
 
If we imagine an asymmetrical relationship between two actors A and B, then 
we can ask the question “where is trust ascribed from?”  Is it A who controls 
trust building or B who decides whether A is worth B’s trust?  Most will think 
that trust cannot be manipulated without that same trust becoming especially 
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fragile.  The revelation of trust which is ungrounded and manipulated forth 
can in itself dissolve trust.  Trust cannot be demanded; it can only be 
attributed and accepted.  But this does not mean that we cannot strengthen 
the building of trust by creating trust promoting conditions such as justice, 
objectivity, reason, democratic encouragement of autonomy, free and equal 
actors, security of rights, holding promises, delivering quality in time, etc.  
This also applies to the expectations against which we weigh and measure 
our trust when we judge that these expectations in themselves should be 
legitimate before the trust judgment becomes legitimate.  A declaration of 
mistrust which cannot be substantiated can, for example, undermine a 
speaker’s trustworthiness. 
     The problem is that there are widely different conditions which occasion 
trust and mistrust.  The phenomena trust and mistrust are asymmetrical, 
because they have different attributes and harbour different sorts of 
justifications.  This leads to a general rule that it is difficult to make use of 
arguments which exemplify mistrust to substantiate trust with.  The 
asymmetry can be shown through the difference between trust, lack of trust, 
and mistrust. 
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  Trust: 
 
Lack of Trust: 
 
Mistrust: 
 
Unjustified 
Expectations: 
 
E.g.  Blind or 
naïve trust 
 
E.g.  If knowledge 
and information 
are not taken 
seriously 
 
E.g.  With 
unjustified angst 
and insecurity, 
which cannot be 
applied to any 
object. 
 
Well-Grounded 
Expectations: 
E.g.  Based on 
positive 
experience 
reaped over a 
long time 
 
E.g.  With a total 
lack of knowledge 
and information.  
Healthy 
skepticism. 
 
E.g.  With 
concrete 
disappointment of 
legitimate 
expectations. 
 
 
 
 
It is often in the cases where we for one or another reason cannot predict 
what other people will do or if the hanging bridge will hold, that we choose to 
compensate for the lack of predictability with blind and unsubstantiated trust.  
Analyses which are based on understanding trust in the light of predictability 
capture a part of the functional of the trust phenomenon, but forget that 
knowledge of something as unforeseeable in practice gets us to take up rules 
of relations and the like precisely because we take in and absorb 
unpredictability in our practice.  If the hanging bridge appears not be able to 
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hold, we grab hold of a lifeline before we go over the cliff.  If it appears on the 
other hand to hold, perhaps we don’t, and the accident becomes much 
greater.  This is similar to when the seller makes a credit evaluation so that 
they can at least have trust that the buyer can act as a buyer.  In a certain 
sense the relationship between our judgment, risk, danger, and trust is less 
risky when we know that something is unpredictable and uncontrollable.  We 
cannot be surprised by the unpredictable, when we know that it is 
unpredictable.   Analyses which understand trust as too closely connected to 
prediction fail to see this relationship.  The argumentation shows again that 
the distinction trust/mistrust is not at all normatively neutral and neutral in 
value, one reason being because expectations always have a direction and 
are value-laden. 
 
 
Trust-Inspiring Communication 
 
     Trust is an essential foundation for most social processes where one 
meets another in a face-to-face communication.  Establishing trust in 
electronically mediated communications like the Internet where people can 
easily fake their true identity becomes a real problem. The more voluntary 
and self-organized unions of free and equal people are, the more important 
trust becomes as an informal resource for social integration.  Trust also acts 
as a psychological need (Giddens 1994:87).  We do not feel as comfortable in 
surroundings characterized by mistrust as in surroundings characterized by 
trust.  Trust appears perhaps for this reason as a positive cultural value.  It 
lies as a part of our cultural inheritance that trust, everything else being equal, 
is simply “better” than mistrust.  If another does not have trust in me, it is not 
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good; others’ trust is immediately good to have.  It is not pleasant to be the 
one no-one trusts. 
     Trust plays a role in our communication with each other.  We normally 
have trust in those who act performatively consistent with their self-
description and who keep their promises.  We do not have trust in those who 
say one thing, but manipulate and mean something else.  Those who 
communicate simply to achieve an effect are not sincere.  Trust breaks down 
from the false, the lie, manipulation, insincerity, and the unauthentic portrayal 
of self.  Trust relations presuppose that one can trust both in the 
communication and in the action coordination the undistorted dialogue can 
yield.  Others’ trust typically arises when one appears in a positive light, lives 
up to one’s self-description, and does what one says over time.  We normally 
have trust in those who act according to norms, in that they act predictably 
and correctly (as long as they obey the norms). 
     If we involve the premise of the future and others’ freedom to manage 
themselves, and thereby the possibility for otherwise trustworthy persons to 
change their actions, trust can be seen as the acceptance of communication 
which involves risk.  In receiving a communicated message, we choose to 
trust in the sender’s authenticity, sincerity and good will. 
    When trust is to be communicated it can be self-dissolving if a person 
repeatedly and loudly speaks of their own sincerity.  It becomes phony and 
false.  When one has claimed one’s own authenticity several times, the 
repetition alone in itself will seem an unauthentic copy.  Authenticity and 
sincerity constitute essential communicative conditions for the creation of 
trust.  It is the dimension of sincerity in communication which creates 
trustworthiness and over time creates trust.  Sincerity is, according to Jürgen 
Habermas, a necessary pragmatic condition for successful communication.  
According to Jürgen Habermas’ interpretation of communication’s inherently 
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necessary (formal-pragmatic) presuppositions, each speaker whom in a 
dialogue will come to mutual understanding with others, shall ask and be able 
to meet the following demands.  The expression shall be (1) syntactically 
comprehensible and understandable, (2) cognitively true, (3) normatively and 
socially right, (4) as well as truthful and sincerely contributed. (ad 1) The 
expression must be understandable so that the speaker and hearer can 
understand each other, before any belief in a proposition can be shared and 
communication can be successful.  (ad 2) The speaker must have the 
intention to contribute a true propositional content, in that the hearer can take 
part in the speaker’s knowledge, so that it can be shared. (ad 3) The speaker 
must express themselves consistently with the norms and values which 
constitute the common normative background, in order for the speaker and 
hearer to be able to reach mutual understanding.  If there is a break with 
norms already in and with an expression, the likelihood for the creation of 
consensus understood as a justified sharing of beliefs is very small. (ad 4) 
The speakers must express themselves truthfully; in other words, give an 
expression which is sincere, and in agreement with the thoughts and 
conditions which in the point of departure and in principle only are accessible 
for the speaker themselves.  The possibilities for establishing an optimal 
understanding are made use of only if there is established mutual trust in and 
with the speaker.  This can happen if the speaker expresses their intentions 
sincerely so that the speech’s expressions for the speaker become 
trustworthy, reliable, and create trust (Habermas 1999:22).  Sincere and 
truthful use of language therefore creates trust. 
     Insincere, unreliable, inauthentic, and untruthful use of language, to the 
contrary, creates mistrust because the speaker in their speech expresses a 
manipulated self-portrayal and gives a faulty impression of themselves.  The 
promise which lies inherent in the self-portrayal is not held.  The self and the 
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self-description do not match.  That sincerity is a necessary pragmatic 
condition for successful communication can be easily seen, if we take an 
example of a father who asks his son what he wants for a Christmas present.  
If the son is not sincere and expresses himself in agreement with his inner 
wishes, the son cannot get his wishes fulfilled.  We can on this background 
substantiate that there can be found trust-weakening and trust-strengthening 
communication, and that insincere communication weakens the creation of 
trust. 
 
 
Trust and Validity 
 
     As a final argument of why trust is good I will present an interpretation of 
why trust and validity are interconnected, and thereby present an 
understanding of trust.  
     Habermas has argued that validity understood as the possible and actual 
arguments for a proposition measured in a discourse against the possible and 
actual arguments against the proposition is differentiated into three types of 
validity-claims. Validity is measured according to truth, rightness and 
truthfulness. If we in the following take a monological perspective in our 
interpretation of the validity claims then persons can establish three different 
kinds of basic relationships, (a) a relationship to themselves; (b) a relationship 
to reality; and (c) a relationship to other persons. These relations correspond 
to taking a subjective, an objective and an inter-subjective attitude.  
     The validity claim truthfulness is a necessary condition for establishing all 
the possible relations to oneself. Whether we are talking of self-
consciousness, self-critique, self-development, self-legislation or any relation 
of that kind where one relates to oneself, it presupposes that the one involved 
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is sincere and truthful to themselves before such a relationship can actually 
be established. In this way truthfulness is constitutive for all relations to 
oneself. The relations are simply not established if truthfulness is not 
established. Truthfulness becomes constitutive for all relations to the internal 
subjective world, to which a person has privileged access.  
 
The validity claim truth is a necessary condition for establishing all the 
possible relations to reality. In order to grasp reality one needs a true belief 
about reality in order to actually have that reality represented and present at 
hand. False beliefs mean exactly that one’s beliefs do not in any way 
meaningfully represent reality. Things, actions, and events and anything in 
the physical world of things presuppose that the person holds true beliefs 
about them to connect to the objective world as such. Due to fallibilism and 
the dualistic distinction between subject and object, we don’t know whether a 
belief is true in the objective sense, but we know whether holding a belief is 
justified, warranted by experience, and whether we can claim something with 
rational assertibility. Nevertheless, truth becomes constitutive for all relations 
to the objective world of things about which we can make true claims.  
 
The validity claim rightness is a necessary condition for establishing 
legitimate relationships between free and rational persons. If a relationship 
between persons is not legitimate, a free and rational person would not want 
that relationship to continue as a social relation. In general, legitimacy is 
justified with reference to norms, which in turn may be justified deontologically 
as objective norm. Legitimacy is always judged by the other, and can never 
be owned and controlled by a single person. Rightness is constitutive for all 
relations to the social world of relations recognized as legitimate by those 
involved. This basic relation demanding legitimacy and mutual recognition 
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before it can be socially stabilized and be reproducible by rational and free 
persons is the foundation on which all other interactions, transactions, and 
communications are built.  
 
In this reading of Habermas (which is admittedly monological and ontological 
because we start from a real person and how that person can possibly relate 
to anything) the result is that the validity claims we exchange in discourses 
are not merely arbitrary, but are derived from a practical and factual 
necessity. We can in our practices only establish those relationships if the 
validity conditions are adequately fulfilled. Especially the relationship between 
persons, which presupposes legitimacy to be a socially integrating and well-
ordered social relation, may account for why trust is not only good but also 
needed in social practices. This is because establishing any relationship 
empirically to another person which is not legitimate will be equal to 
undermining this person’s ability to act as a rational and free person. If they 
were free and rational, any illegitimate relationship would be broken off or not 
even be established in the first place. As I understand it, it is this implicit 
threat to freedom and rationality which guides the judgments of trust. We 
basically trust persons with whom we interact, communicate, and do 
transactions with when the relationship is fundamentally legitimate. We 
distrust persons who sustain an illegitimate relationship and thereby in 
consequence diminish our rationality and freedom. This is why the problem of 
trust is internally connected to the demand for legitimacy, for freedom, and for 
rationality. Trust is good because it demonstrates that the relationship in 
which we interact with other persons is legitimate and can be normatively 
justified as right according to justified norms. Trust is good because norms 
are good. The argument suggested above also explains why trust is so 
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constitutive for social relationships and to the existence of informal social co-
operation.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
     I have in various ways sought to argue that trust / mistrust are value-laden 
phenomena (and concepts); in an attempt to show that any presupposition 
about value neutrality does not hold in our culture.  At the same time I have 
addressed the problem which trust production involves by addressing 
essential preconditions and connections.  In every section there is an 
argument for the value-laden nature of the trust concept.  Concepts related to 
the trust concept, and which show a family resemblance with trust are value-
laden concepts.  Trust has a value constitutive for desired social processes, 
whether that value is acknowledged and planned or not.  The essential 
reason behind the attempt of some leaders to use trust and trust production 
as a strategic means to the design of leadership and organization, is that it is 
connected with something positive and good, something which is not neutral 
in value.  The knowledge of the phenomena one evaluates has value in 
relation to a declaration of trust or mistrust.  Expectations can be more or less 
flexible, which in itself reflects a type of value judgment.  There is further a 
value difference in sincere and trust-inspiring communication on the one 
hand, and trust-weakening communication on the other.  An essential 
motivation for sincerity in one’s communication with others is that this is a 
pragmatic condition for the creation of trust.  Establishing legitimate 
interpersonal relationships and accommodating the actions of other people as 
rational and free beings will also create trust. All in all several grounds to 
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demonstrate that trust and mistrust are not value-neutral and should not be 
understood, nor analyzed as if they were normatively neutral. This is 
important to leaders caring about trust as a concept and as a phenomena. 
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i Understanding trust as normatively neutral and as merely a means of reducing social 
complexity (and if we take trust in material things into account material complexity) seems 
to be the standpoint taken by Niklas Luhmann and other to Luhmann related thinkers. The 
ideals of value free perspectives and observations we find in positivism and some systems 
theoretic approaches  
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